Summer: According to German police, an Iranian deportee phoned American police and intelligence agencies several times to warn of the planned attack on the World Trade Center, to take place "during the week of September 9." German police confirm the calls but state that the US Secret Service would not reveal any further information. The information was provided by the Jordanian intelligence agency GID, which also sent the warning directly to the CIA station in Amman. After September 11, when Bush officials let it be known that they intended to deny any such warnings, the GID backed off on corroborating its earlier confirmations. (From the Wilderness)
Summer: Congressman Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, later says on the intelligence monitoring of terrorist groups: "the chatter level went way off the charts" around this time and stayed high until 9/11. Given his history as a CIA operative, presumably he was kept "in the know" to an extent. A later Congressional report states: "some individuals within the intelligence community have suggested that the increase in threat reporting was unprecedented, at least in terms of their own experience." Two counter-terrorism officials later describe the alerts of this summer as "the most urgent in decades." (Washington Post)
Summer: Egyptian investigators track down a close associate of bin Laden named Ahmed al-Khadir, wanted for bombing the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. Egyptians surround the safe house in Pakistan where al-Khadir is hiding. They notify the ISI to help arrest him, and the ISI promises swift action. Instead, a car sent by the ISI filled with Taliban and having diplomatic plates arrives, grabs al-Khadir and drives him to safety in Afghanistan. Time magazine later brings
up the incident to show the strong ties between the ISI and both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. (CCR)
Summer: Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia, makes a clandestine visit to Pakistan around this time. After meeting with senior army officials, he visits Afghanistan with ISI Director Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed. They meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and try to convince him that the US is likely to launch an attack on Afghanistan. They insist bin Laden be sent to Saudi Arabia, where he would be held in custody and not handed over to any third country. If bin Laden were to be tried in Saudi Arabia, Abdullah would help make sure he is acquitted. Mullah Omar apparently rejects the proposal. (CCR)
Summer: Since 1997 there are only fourteen fighter planes on active alert to defend the continental US at any one time. But in the months before 9/11, rather than increase the number, the Pentagon was planning to reduce the number still further. Task forces assigned by Rumsfeld were preparing to recommend that a reduction in air defense flights be made. By comparison, in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, the US had thousands of fighters on alert throughout the US. Also during this time, FAA officials try to dispense with "primary" radars altogether, so that if a plane were to turn its transponder off, no radar could see it. NORAD rejects the proposal. (CCR)
June: Based on German intelligence findings and other sources, the US issues a warning: "sunni extremists associated with al-Qaeda are most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties." The advisory mentions the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Italy as possible targets for an attack. The CIA provides senior officials with a warning that an al-Qaeda attack may be planned for the 4th of July celebration. (From the Wilderness)
June: Three Middle Eastern men are detained for snapping reconissance photos of FBI headquarters in New York City. Their film is confiscated, but they are released before the film is developed. The developed film shows snapshots of security checkpoints and police posts at the FBI building, two federal courthouses, and another federal building. It is now believed that the photographers were linked to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 bombings. (CCR)
June: US intelligence learns that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is interested in "sending terrorists to the United States" and planning to assist their activities once they arrive. Though the FBI has a $2 million reward on Mohammed's head, subsequent data collection efforts are not "targeted on information about [Mohammed] that might have helped understand al-Qaeda's plans and intentions." These efforts include tapped phone calls between Mohammed and Mohamed Atta which are ignored, and one phone call on September 10 in which Mohammed gives Atta final approval for the 9/11 attacks which is also ignored. (CCR)
June 1-2: A multi-agency planning exercise sponsored by NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command, in charge of defending US airspace) involves the hypothetical scenario of a cruise missile launched by "a rogue (government) or somebody" from a barge off the East Coast. Bin Laden is pictured on the cover of the proposal for the exercise. After 9/11, the government claims that this type of an attack was completely unexpected, and as a result it had only 14 fighters on standby to defend the entire US. (CCR)
Early June: The Arabic television station Al-Jazeera airs a tape by bin Laden which threatens attacks on Western targets. Also, the Echelon intelligence gathering system provides a warning from German intelligence that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning on hijacking commercial airliners and fly them into national landmarks and other highly visible American target sites. (CCR)
June 3: This is one of only two dates that Bush's national security leadership meets formally to discuss terrorism. This group, made up of the National Security Adviser, CIA Director, Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, met around 100 times before 9/11 to discuss a variety of topics, but rarely to discuss terrorism. In wake of these reports, the White House "aggressively defended the level of attention, given only scattered hints of al-Qaeda activity." This lack of discussion stands in sharp contrast to the actions of the Clinton administration and public comments by the Bush administration. (CCR)
June 9-12: FBI agent Robert Wright, who spent ten years investigating terrorist funding, writes a memo harshly criticizing the FBI. He writes, "Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are transferred from the FBI, I will not feel safe.... The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected international terrorists living in the United States." He claims the "FBI was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest when a terrorist attack occurred" rather than actually trying to stop the attacks. Wright, who will go public with his predictions in late May 2002, claims that "corruption within the FBI" hampered its ability to investigate terrorist activities, and says that the FBI was in possession of evidence showing that the WTC was a prime target for al-Qaeda hijackers. He also claims that FBI Director Robert Mueller threatened him with prosecution if he made his allegations public. Wright's allegations are largely ignored when they first become public a year later. (NewsMax)
June 11: FBI agents from the New York office and Washington headquarters meet with CIA officials to discuss the USS Cole investigation. The FBI agents are shown photographs from the Malaysia meeting, including pictures of hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, but are not given copies. "The FBI agents recognized the men from the Cole investigation, but when they asked the CIA what they knew about the men, they were told that they didn't have clearance to share that information. It ended up in a shouting match." A CIA official later admits that he knew more about Alhazmi and Almihdhar that he was willing to tell the FBI. The FBI agents don't receive the information they want about these two until after 9/11. Two days after this meeting, Almihdhar has no trouble getting a new multiple reentry US visa. (CCR)
June 13: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak claims that Egyptian intelligence discovers a "communiqué from bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate George W. Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Italy." The communiqué specifically mentions this would be done via "an airplane stuffed with explosives." The US and Italy are sent urgent warnings of this and the attack is apparently aborted. (CCR)
June 22: The State Department issues a "worldwide caution" regarding unspecified terrorist threats. U.S. military forces are put on the highest alert status, Condition Delta. As noted above, CIA Director Tenet is described as "nearly frantic" over the possibility of attack. (CCR)
June 23: Reuters distributes a report headlined "Bin Laden Fighters Plan anti-US attack." The lead paragraph begins: "Followers of exiled Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden are planning a major attack on US and Israeli interests." The article gets virtually no media play in the US American response to the report, which was based on an Arabic journalist's meeting with bin Laden, was to put Gulf-based forces "on "threat condition Delta" based on a non-specific but credible threat linked to Bin Laden." (CCR)
June 25: UPI informs its subscribers that "saudi dissident Osama bin Laden is planning a terrorist attack against the United States." Again, the article is virtually ignored by the American media. (CCR)
June 26: The State Department issues a worldwide caution warning American citizens of possible attacks. (CCR)
June 28: CIA Director Tenet writes an intelligence summary for National Security Adviser Rice: "It is highly likely that a significant al-Qaeda attack is in the near future, within several weeks." Rice will later claim that everyone was taken by complete surprise by the 9/11 attack. (CCR)
Late June: White House National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke gives a direct warning to the FAA to increase security measures in light of an impending terrorist attack. The FAA refuses to take such measures. (CCR)